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TERM LIMITS: HISTORY, DEMOCRACY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
HARRY

H. WELLINGTON

The Supreme Court's 1994 October Term produced a number of
major constitutional decisions; decisions that were often, but not always,
by the narrowest of majorities. The bulk of these five to four cases will
require, as Justice Frankfurter once remarked, considerable "litigating
elucidation" before the effect of each on the shape of our higher law can

be ascertained with any degree of certainty.' This is hardly surprising.
Important constitutional issues that sharply divide the Court may require
the author of a majority opinion, if he or she is to maintain the majority,

to negotiate with other justices about the language and scope of what is
published. This can lead to an opinion that is relatively vague or
purposely ambiguous. 2
Some of the cases that seem to fit this category and will require
"litigating elucidation," addressed redistricting and race,3 affirmative
action,4 the limits on congressional power to regulate activities under the
commerce clause,' and the nature of permissible goyernmental support of

religious activities.6

* Dean and Professor of Law, New York Law School. The author thanks Kevin
A. Doherty and Louis J. Najmy, students at New York Law School, for their assistance.
1. See Machinists v. Gonzalez, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958).
2. See, e.g., JAMEs A. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS (1995) (describing in detail the
strategic considerations and negotiations among the Supreme Court justices in developing
opinions); see also DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER (1986) (suggesting that as a
tactical decision to preserve a doubtful majority, the assigning justice will often give the
opinion to the justice most closely aligned with the dissent, providing a balanced, albeit
ambiguous, opinion).
3. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (holding unconstitutional a racially
motivated gerrymander).
4. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (holding that
strict scrutiny will be applied to federal as well as state statutes employing racial
classifications).
5. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that Congress had
exceeded its power under the commerce clause by criminalizing the possession of
handguns within school zones).
6. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995)
(holding that withholding funds from a student organization involved in printing a
religious newspaper violated the First Amendment).
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One five to four case,7 however, that will require no subsequent
litigation to clarify its meaning involved the effort of Arkansas to limit the
number of terms its representatives or senators may serve in the United
States Congress. The Arkansas electorate, in 1992, had amended the
state's constitution to deny certification as a candidate or a place on the
ballot to any person seeking reelection who had been elected to two or
more terms in the U.S. Senate or three or more terms in the House of
Representatives.
"Allowing individual States to adopt their own
qualifications for congressional service," said the Court in U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,8 "would be inconsistent with the Framers' vision
of a uniform National Legislature representing the people of the United
States. If the qualifications set forth in the text of the Constitution are to
be changed, that text must be amended."'
Nothing could be clearer:
State-imposed term limits are
unconstitutional. I think this holding is correct, but for reasons that depart
from those developed by the Court. Notice, however, that an amendment
is necessary not only for term limits but for any other requirement, "not
contained in the text of the Constitution," 10 that a state may wish to make
a condition for election to Congress. "Today's decision," the dissent
correctly reports, "also means that no State may disqualify congressional
candidates whom a court has found to be mentally incompetent . .. , who
are currently in prison . . . , or who have past vote-fraud convictions."11
I believe the Constitution should be read to permit such disqualifications
and others that do not offend the structure of our governing document,
such as the requirement that a candidate for the House reside in the district
she seeks to represent. The Court reaches its conclusions by misusing
history (as does the dissent), by imagining federalism to be less complex
than it is (as does the dissent), and by overemphasizing certain democratic
principles and underemphasizing others (as does the dissent).
I hope in this essay to persuade you that these claims are correct and
to use the issue of term limits to inspect some important questions of
constitutional interpretation.' 2

7. U.s. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
8. Id. at 1845.

9. Id.
10. Id. at 1860-61 n.27.
11. Id. at 1909 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
12. The second issue in this case that this essay does not explore is whether
Arkansas Amendment 73 is merely a ballot access restriction rather than an outright
disqualification and whether this would be of constitutional significance. Id. at 1866-70.
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I.
The text of the Constitution that directly addresses the qualifications
for federal legislators is found in Article I. The first qualification reads:
"No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the
Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in
which he shall be chosen.""3 Section three, clause three substitutes
"Senator" for "Representative," raises the age to "thirty Years," and the
citizenship requirement to nine. 4 There are a few other provisions in
5 For example,
the Constitution that impose additional qualifications. 1
Article I also states that you may not be a member of Congress while
"holding any Office under the United States ... ,"16 and Article VI bars
any religious test for office. 7 These provisions cast some, but not much,
light on the central question of whether the qualifications clauses preclude
the states from imposing additional requirements on would-be candidates
for Congress. The qualifications clauses themselves cannot answer this
question, for they say nothing about additional qualifications.
The question is one example of an old problem. If a provision in a
document spells out certain requirements, restrictions, or conditions of
various sorts, how can you tell, if the provision does not tell you, whether
they are just examples of a class of requirements, are minimum
restrictions, or exclusive conditions? Extrinsic evidence is necessary, and
the best place to commence the search for extrinsic evidence is to consult
other portions of the document whose specific provisions you want to
understand. Lawyers who like Latin would say that the remaining text is
being consulted to determine whether the maxim, expressio unius est
exclusio alteius, s is appropriately applied to the qualifications clauses."
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
14. Id. § 3, cl. 3.
15. See Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1847 n.2 (disqualifying representatives and
senators for conviction in impeachment proceedings or for engaging in an insurrection
or rebellion against the Constitution).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
17. Id. art. VI, cl. 3.
18. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990) ("A maxim of statutory
interpretation meaning the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.").
19. See Term Limits, 115 S.Ct. at 1850 n.9 (where the majority posits an expressio
unius argument suggesting the enumeration of certain qualifications in Article I precludes
all others). But see id. at 1903 (where the dissent claims the majority's expressio unius
argument cuts against the majority because Article VI's prohibition on state-imposed
religious disqualifications suggests that other types of disqualifications are permissible).
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Both the majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens and joined by
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, and the dissent of Justice
Thomas, subscribed to by the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and
Scalia, agree on the importance of the Tenth Amendment in this
interpretive project. The last amendment in the Bill of Rights states:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people. "I
The language of the Tenth Amendment does not seem to advance our
inquiry. It merely restates the question in different terms. But the Court
reasoned that the states cannot have any reserve power with respect to
Congressional qualifications because they could not have had any power
over the qualifications of candidates for Congress before there was a
Congress; that is, before the Constitution was ratified. You cannot
reserve a power you never possessed. 2 ' While there is some authority
for this position, the dissent does a reasonably effective job of
distinguishing it, and, in effect, of claiming that the Court's interpretation
is overly technical. For the dissent, it is not obvious that, when
something new-the United States of America-was created, a power that
could not have existed before may have been "reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people".' Indeed, the dissent firmly believes this
happened. Nor is it obvious, as the Court recognized, that the states lack
power even if its understanding of "reserved" is correct;
the
qualifications clauses, when properly interpreted, or other constitutional
provisions, or the nature and structure of the Constitution as a whole, may
bestow power on the states.
Both the Court and the dissent undertook their interpretive tasks by
insisting upon overly abstract and therefore insufficiently realistic
conceptions of American government. And both excavated in the partial
and sometimes distorted documentary history of the framing and
ratification for bits and pieces of evidence to support their highly abstract
conceptions.
II.
Some of the conceptions are themselves familiar. The national
Government is a government of delegated powers. 3 What has not been
delegated or prohibited by the Constitution belongs to "the States
20. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
21. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1854, relying on McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 430 (1819).
22. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1878 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

23. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-11.
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respectively, or to the people."24 And "all power stems from the consent
of the people. "25 So far this is unexceptional. But the dissent insists that
"[t]he ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is the consent of the
people of each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated
people of the Nation as a whole."'
It is a little difficult to know what the dissent means given the
Preamble to the Constitution.27 Nonetheless, in the context of the times,
the dissent's explanation of the "Constitution's authority" has a radical
states' rights ring to it. Given the jurisprudence of the Court's 1994
Term, the congressional elections of 1994 and the potential for the results
of that election to metastasize to the executive branch in 1996, it is easy
to imagine that, before the millennium, the Reagan revolution will have
succeeded.
Consider first the Court's decision in United States v. Lopez.' For
the first time in sixty years, the Court held that Congress had exceeded its
power to legislate under the Commerce Clause.29 The case involved the
Gun-Free School Zones Act,3" which made it a federal crime to possess
a firearm on or near school grounds. To be sure, it is unclear how much
the Court has cut back on the commerce power. But it is hard to deny
that it has cut back.3 Moreover, it is interesting that the Court in Lopez
consisted of the dissenters in Tenn Limits plus Justice Kennedy.
Consider second the 104th Congress.
It seems determined,
particularly in the House, to reduce the national Government and "return"
power to the states; to undo, as best it can, the New Deal and its
legacy.32 A President, a Congress, and a Court (with a new justice
24. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
25. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

26. Id.
27. The Preamble begins: "We the People of the United States" U.S. CONST.
pmbl. (emphasis added).
28. 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
29. Id. at 1634.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1995).
31. This is reflected in a few court of appeals and district court cases which have
interpreted Lopez as restricting Congress' power to regulate through the commerce
clause. See, e.g., U.S. v. Denalli, 73 F.3d 328 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that arson
against a private residence does not affect interstate commerce sufficiently to justify a
conviction under a federal arson law).
32. See John Harwood, Revolution I: Reagan-Era VeteransAre Now Determined
to Revive "8Os Policies, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1995, at Al (explaining that the 104th
Congress wants to reduce the size and scope of the federal government by "dismantling
chunks of the federal edifice that Franklin Roosevelt began erecting" as part of the New
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replacing one in the Term Limits' majority) all dedicated to a diminished
national role and enhanced state power could work the most fundamental
structural transformation in the relationship 3among governments and the
people of the United States since the 1930s.
That the dissenting opinion in Term Limits is radical in its view of
both state and national power emerges early. Consider this "first
principle," as Justice Thomas calls it: "The Federal Government and the
States . . . face different default rules: where the Constitution is silent
about the exercise of a particular power-that is, where the Constitution
does not speak either expressly or by necessary implication-the Federal
Government lacks that power and the states enjoy it."'
Now, of course, we know that the word "necessary" in the Necessary
and Proper Clause of the Constitution35 does not mean "absolutely
necessary" or "indispensable." McCulloch v. Maryland was clear on
this.36 Moreover, the dissent disputes a footnote in the Court's opinion
stating in part that:
the Court has never treated the dissent's 'default rule' as
absolute. In McCulloch v. Maryland.. . Chief Justice Marshall
rejected the argument that the Constitution's silence on State
power to tax federal instrumentalities requires that States have the
power to do so. Under the dissent's unyielding approach, it
would seem that McCulloch was wrongly decided.37
Perhaps the Court goes too far. But the dissent's talk of "default
rules," and its insistence that the very authority of the Constitution comes
from the consent of the "people of each individual State, not the consent
of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole"3 8 suggests that
where the Constitution is silent, the presumption is strongly against federal
power and strongly for state power. Indeed, the dissent speaks in terms
of burdens: "[W]e must point to something in the Federal Constitution
Deal).

33. See, e.g., Walter Dean Burnham, The Fourth American Republic?, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 16, 1995, at A14 (citing 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991)).
34. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1876 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
35. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18.
36. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414-15 (1819).

37. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1851 n.12 (citations omitted).

38. Id. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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that deprives the people of Arkansas of the power to enact [term limits].
... The majority disagrees that it bears this burden.""
Indeed it does; for the Court the burden runs the other way. And this
is not just because of the Court's understanding of "reserved" in the Tenth
Amendment. It is also because of its understanding of Congress. Here
the Court follows Justice Story in his Commentaries: "each Member of
Congress is 'an officer of the union, deriving his powers and
qualifications from the constitution, and neither created by, dependant
upon, nor controlled by, the states.... [They] owe their existence and
functions to the united voice of the whole, not of a portion, of the
people.'"'" Surely there is considerable truth in this, but there is also
considerable truth in the dissent's observation that "the people of Georgia
have no say over whom the people of Massachusetts select to represent
them in Congress." 4' And it is also true that the representatives from
each state give considerable attention to the parochial interests of the
people of their state. Try to get elected from an important tobacco
producing congressional district if you favor the FDA declaring nicotine
an addictive drug.
At any rate, this much seems clear. Both the Court and the dissent
approach the constitutionality of term limits with diametrically different
presumptions. Each presumes a form of federalism that is more extreme
than is warranted by the practices of our federal system. It also seems
clear that the outcome in Term Limits is preordained if you accept the
presumption of either side. How you interpret the Constitution often
depends on your basic premises, and the provisions of the Constitution-in
addition to the Tenth Amendment-that are relevant to the term limits
question, are no exception.
III.
The Court, in support of its interpretation of the Tenth Amendment
and the exclusivity of the qualifications clauses, refers to Article I: "Each
House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of
The Court reasons that this "gives the
"..."42
its own Members .
representatives of all the people the final say in judging the qualifications
of the representatives of any one State."' But it does not follow from
39. Id. at 1877 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 1855 (quoting 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES
THE UNITED STATES § 627 (3d ed. 1858)).
41. Id. at 1882 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.

43. Term Limits, 115 S.Ct. at 1855.

ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
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this, as the Court suggests it does, that state law cannot add qualifications.
In making its judgment, the appropriate branch of Congress can apply
state law. Indeed, as the dissent points out, "it generally is state law that
determines what is necessary to win an election and whether any particular
ballot is valid . . . ."4 Accordingly, "each House of Congress clearly
must look to state law in judging the 'Elections' and 'Returns' of its
Members." 4' If "Elections" and "Returns," why not "Qualifications?"
As with every one of the Constitutional provisions recruited in support of
its holding, the Court's answer depends on extrinsic evidence e.g., other
provisions, history, prior decisional law, and premises leading to a
presumption based on a conception of American government. This
conception is itself informed by the extrinsic evidence under investigation.
So too with the dissent. This is appropriate. The problem is getting it
right.
Consider some other sections of the Constitution relating to
compensation and elections. Article I provides: "The Senators and
Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be
ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States."46
Article I further provides that the "Electors [of the House of
Representatives] in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for
Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature."'47 And
Article I gives each state legislature regulatory authority over the "Times,
Places and Manner" for holding Congressionaf elections; "[b]ut the
Congress may . . . by Law make or alter such Regulations."48
The Court reads these provisions as "intended [by the Framers] to
minimize the possibility of state interference with federal elections." 4
Assuming that the Court is correct about the intention of the Framers and
that their intention is controlling, it seems a leap for the Court to
conclude, as it does, that "[i]n light of the Framers' evident concern that
States would try to undermine the National Government, they could not
have intended States to have the power to set qualifications. "5 Some
qualifications, to be sure; but all qualifications? Term limitations? Why
is the Court's approach all or nothing? Is it not clear that there are some
qualifications that would "undermine" the national Government and some
44. Id. at 1897 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
45. Id.

46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
47. Id. § 2, cl. 1.
48. Id. § 4, cl. 1.

49. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1857.
50. Id. at 1858.
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that would not?"1 Indeed, is it not probable that the qualifications
necessary to be an Elector "of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature" 5 -- a matter that the Framers left to the states-would
influence the de facto qualifications required by a successful candidate for
Congress? Is it not reasonable to assume, even at the time of the
founding, that electors were apt to prefer Congressmen who shared their
economic interests and social perspectives?
The all or nothing approach of the Court 3 derives from some highly
abstract propositions about American government e.g., federalism and
democratic principles, reinforced by the problematic use of snippets of
historically questionable evidence. This is not the best way to decide an
important constitutional case.
IV.
The Court declared that its absolute ban on state power vindicated
three fundamental principles of representative democracy. The first two
were important to the holding in Powell v. McCormack.' Adam Clayton
Powell, who was elected to the 90th Congress from Harlem, was not
seated because the House found that he had engaged in financial
improprieties while a member of the 89th Congress. The Court held the
House lacked "authority to exclude any person, duly elected by his
constituents, who meets all the requirements for membership expressly
prescribed in the Constitution."' 5 The Court grounded this holding on
history and the fundamental democratic principles that, "the people should
51. A requirementthat a Congressmanbe from a certain profession could be thought

to "undermine" the national Government. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
But a requirement that a Congressman have no recorded vote fraud convictions would
generally not be thought to "undermine" the national Government. See Term Limits, 115
S. Ct. at 1909 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
52. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2.
53. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (where
the Court adopted a formalistic approach in striking down a one house legislative veto).
In dissent Justice White objected: "our Federal Government was intentionally chartered
with the flexibility to respond to contemporary needs without losing sight of fundamental
democratic principles ....
This is the perspective from which we should approach..
• novel constitutional questions. . . ." Id. at 978 (White, J., dissenting). See also
Kathleen Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109

HARV. L. REV. 78 (1995).
54. 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (Warren, C.J.).
55. Id. at 522 (emphasis omitted).
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choose whom they please to govern them," 56 and that, "an aspect of
sovereignty is the right of the people to vote for whom they wish.""
Well, yes, but what does it mean to say that "the people should
choose whom they please to govern them?" It does mean that Adam
Clayton Powell, who was chosen by the people in his congressional
district, could not be denied his seat." District lines, however, are often
drawn by state legislatures to insure the election of the candidate of one
party.5 9 The people in that district who belong to another party do not
have an opportunity to "choose whom they please to govern them."
Of course the majority rules and the people who vote for the losing
candidate never choose whom they please to govern them. But, in a
swing district, that is a direct consequence of majority rule. Everyone has
an opportunity to choose whom she pleases.
In a politically
gerrymandered district, it is the direct consequence of the gerrymander.
Once the district lines are drawn, no one in the wrong party has an
opportunity to choose whom she pleases. Put another way, in a politically
gerrymandered district a state imposed de facto qualification for election
is membership in the right party.
Once this abstract democratic principle that, "the people should
choose whom they please to govern them," is qualified, as it must be if
it is to be realistic, it loses force as a strong argument against the power
of a state to impose a less restrictive de jure qualification on congressional
candidates.
The second fundamental principle of democracy, namely that "an
aspect of sovereignty is the right of the people to vote for whom they
wish,"' also needs some qualification. Yes, if the candidate you wish
to vote for can get on the ballot. State law and party rules govern, and
while the constitution affords substantial protection sometimes, as in New
York's Republican presidential primary, the hurdles a would-be candidate
56. Id. at 541.
57. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1863 (discussing Powell,
395 U.S. 486).
58. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 522 (holding that expulsion power of Congress does not
extend to exclude duly elected representatives who satisfy the constitutional qualifications

for office).
59. This "political" gerrymandering has been accepted by the Court with little

scrutiny. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (upholding political
gerrymandering for state legislatures). See also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 160
(1986) (where Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor concurred in
the Court's decision upholding an Indiana redistricting plan but insisted that political

redistricting is non-justiciable).
60. Term Limits, 115. S. Ct. at 1863.
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faces are very high indeed. 6 But more important is the question whether
or to what extent term limits compromise the principle that those who can
vote should be able to vote for whom they wish.
If the people of a state amend the constitution of the state in order to
impose term limits on candidates, they are exercising their sovereignty and
deciding now that they do not wish to vote in the future for a certain class
of potential candidates. This is a choice. It may be unwise, as I believe
it is, but people are always choosing, and often unwisely, to bind their
future. And deciding now whom not to vote for is a part of the process
of deciding whom to vote for later. Perhaps the same thing can be said
formally of laws relating to ballot access or political gerrymanders, but the
connection to the electors' choice is usually much more attenuated. It is
one thing to vote directly for term limitations; it is quite another to vote
for representatives to a state legislature, who-among their many
tasks-draw congressional district lines each decade and, from time to
time, enact ballot access laws.
Finally, the Court reasons that state qualifications, unlike those
imposed by the House in Powell, violate a third fundamental democratic
principle: "that the right to choose representatives belongs not to the
States, but to the people. "62 This is true. But the people do vote in the
states; the states do impose de facto qualifications on candidates, and
representatives do advance or protect state as well as national interests.
The Court, however, insists that "[p]ermitting individual States to
formulate diverse qualifications for their representatives would result in a
patchwork of state qualifications, undermining the uniformity and national
character that the Framers envisioned and sought to ensure."63 While
some state qualifications could undermine the national character of
61. See Rockefeller v. Powers, Nos. 95-9189, 95-9213, and 95-9267 1995 WL
790831 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a ballot access

restriction enacted by the New York Legislature by a candidate for the Republican

primary). But see Rockefeller v. Powers, Nos. 96-7173, 1694 1996 WL 87475 (2d Cir.

1996) (affirming a First Amendment challenge that the exclusion of candidate Steve

Forbes' delegates from the ballot of the 1996 Republican primary places substantial

burdens on his candidacy). See also Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers
Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979) (holding that Illinois statute which required new political
parties to obtain 25,000 signatures in order to be placed on the ballot in state elections

and signatures of 5% of voters for offices of subdivisions of the state serves no
compelling state interest and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (holding that Texas statute which
assessed filing fee for prospective candidates, apportioned on the "importance,

involvement and term of office" was violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
62. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1863.
63. Id. at 1864.
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Congress, I fail to see why term limits do. Some states may have less
experienced representatives than others, but that does not make the
Congress less national in character. And I must confess that I do not
know what, in this context, the Court means by "uniformity" unless it is
just a statement of its conclusion qualifications are restricted to those
spelled out in the Constitution; to permit any additional state qualifications
is not to have "uniform" qualifications. This, the Court tells us is what
the "Framers envisioned and sought to ensure."' Do we know this with
any certainty and, if we do, how much should it count?
V.
Both the Court and the dissent turned to the documentary record of
the Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates in the states to
demonstrate the intention of the Framers on the question before them.
This is standard practice. It was followed extensively in Powell,6' and
the Court in Term Limits recounts at length the Powell "findings."' It
tells us that they support the conclusion that qualifications for
congressional candidates are fixed in the Constitution and cannot be
supplemented either by Congress or the states. 67
There is sharp disagreement over the significance and appropriate use
in constitutional interpretation of the Framers' intentions.68 Most agree,
however, that if we had a good understanding of what the Framers
intended, that understanding would be helpful in establishing what the
Framers believed the Constitution meant at the time it was adopted. The
quest by lawyers and judges for a good understanding begins with the
writings of historians who have illuminated the relevant English, colonial
and revolutionary periods as well as the history of the founding itself.
This is essential background, but it generally will not provide an
investigator with a good understanding of the Framers' intentions about a
specific matter such as the exclusivity of the Constitution's list of
qualifications for congressional candidates. It seems logical then to turn
to the documentary record of the Philadelphia convention and ratification
64. Id.
65. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).

66. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1848-53.
67. Id.
68. Compare ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW

143-265 (1990) (suggesting that democracy is furthered by

limiting the judiciary to an inquiry into original understanding, so as to allow the elected
representatives to expand, modify or repeal existing, interpreted law) with RONALD

DwoRKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 359-69 (1986) (noting that some judges believe that a fair
opinion does not require interpreting the intentions of the framers).
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debates in the states. But this logical move to the documentary record
rests on the premise that the history is sufficiently complete to make it
helpful and sufficiently truthful to make it reliable. Because this premise
is questionable, conclusions drawn from the documentary record are
suspect when they purport to answer so specific a question as that raised
in Terr Limits. The dissent accordingly is correct to reject the Court's
reliance on the absence of evidence addressing state power over term
limitations in the ratification debates-even though the restriction was well
known at the time and written into the Articles of
Confederation- "because the surviving records of those debates are

fragmentary. "69
James H. Hutson has produced a persuasive monograph on this
matter.7" He writes that "[slome . . . newly discovered documents raise
questions concerning the reliability of the principal printed sources of
information about the drafting and ratification of the Constitution . . .
,71 Hutson's research suggests that apart from Madison's notes, which
are radically incomplete, the standard sources for determining the
Founders' intentions are highly unreliable evidence of what took place.
Indeed, much of the documentary record apparently was manufactured
subsequently for political purposes. Hutson issues this caveat about
Convention records: "there are problems with most of them and . . .
some have been compromised-perhaps fatally-by the editorial
interventions of hirelings and partisans."' And, he adds, "[t]o recover
original intent from these records may be an impossible hermeneutic
assignment."'
He asks:
"If Convention records are not faithful
accounts of what was said by the delegates in 1787 how can we know
what they intended?"'74 If Hutson is right we often cannot know. Judges
and lawyers, therefore, should be careful about their assertions.
But, of course, the Federalist Papers have a special role for these
users of the documentary record. They are, as Paul Kahn has called
69. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1901 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
70. James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the
DocumentaryRecord, 65 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1986). In support, the dissent cited Hutson,
who states that, "arguments based on the absence of recorded debate at the ratification
conventions are suspect, because the surviving records of those debates are fragmentary.
We have no records at all of the debates in several of the conventions." Term Limits,
115 S. Ct. at 1901.
71. Hutson, supra note 70, at 1.
72. Id.at 2.

73. Id.
74. Id.
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them, "the foundational text of constitutional law . . .,"5 and they are
"simultaneously a part of a particular political debate [over ratification of
the Constitution by the people of New York] and the presentation of a
general theory on the nature of political order."76 In Term Limits, they
are used as an aid to understanding whether the Framers intended states
to have the power of adding qualifications for congressional office. The
assumption is that if Publius said it the Framers intended it, particularly
if Publius is Madison.
The Court examined Federalist 52 and 57,77 both written by
Madison, and found support for a lack of any state power.78 The reading
is plausible but, to my mind, overly broad. Consider Federalist 57.
Publius is answering the Anti-Federalists' charge that the House of
Representatives will be composed of "that class of citizens which will have
least sympathy with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at
79
an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few."
Publius argues that there is protection against this, namely, the electors
and the objects of popular choice.'
Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not
the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the
ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than
the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The
electors are to be the great body of the people of the United
States. They are to be the same who exercise the right in every
State of electing the corresponding branch of the legislature of the
State.
Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen
whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence
of his country. No qualification of wealth, or birth, of religious
faith, or of civil profession, is permitted to fetter the judgment or
disappoint the inclination of the people. 8

75. PAUL KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HIsTORY (1992).
76. Id. at 13.

77. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1856-59 (1995).
78. Id.
79. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

80. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 325-30 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).

81. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 351 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

19961

TERM LIMITS

Madison, perhaps because of the dual nature of the Federalistenterprise,
does not seem to have it quite right about the electors. If, in 1788, you
had to own property to vote for your state representative, you probably
were richer than your fellow citizen who, for lack of ownership, was
denied the franchise. But the important point is that in both Federalist57
and 52 it is plausible to read Madison as writing about qualifications
imposed by the Constitution and limitations on additional state
qualifications to the extent that they interfere with the functioning of the
House of Representatives as a national legislative body representing the
people.
In Federalist 52, he contrasts the electors with the objects of the
peoples' choice.
The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and
properly defined by the State constitutions, and being at the same
time more susceptible of uniformity, have been very properly
considered and regulated by the convention. [Madison then sets
forth the qualifications in the Constitution, and continues.] Under
these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the federal
government is open to merit of every description, whether native
or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty
or wealth, or to any particular profession or religious faith. 8
The Constitution itself bars a religious test as a qualification and
addresses "native or adoptive," as well as "young or old"; "poverty or
wealth" tracks what Madison says about electors; and the requirement of
a "particular profession" is a good example of a qualification that could
interfere with the House as a national legislative body by rendering it
unduly responsive in its deliberations to a particular faction.
VI.
But let us assume with the Court that the Framers intended to preclude
the states from adding any qualifications to those constitutionally
mandated. To what extent should this control constitutional interpretation
today?
Reliance on the intention of the Framers is a tradition in American
constitutional law. s3 In part this tradition may rest on the simple idea
that the best way to understand an ambiguous text is to consult the author,
or, if the author is no longer around, his notes and records. This
approach would seem to make sense if you believe that the author retains
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
83. See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
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sovereignty over the published text. This is a much mooted question, here
complicated by the fact that the author of the Constitution is a
convention.' 4 But I would prefer to put this question to one side because
even if you believe in continued sovereignty there are problems. If the
author does not intend that his notes and records be used by subsequent
generations for interpretation, he has abandoned his sovereignty over the
published text. He has not authorized the use of his notes and records for
the interpretive purposes you wish to put them.
This does seem to be the way the Framers viewed things. H. Jefferson
Powell has investigated the matter extensively.
He tells us: "It is
commonly assumed that the 'interpretive intention' of the Constitution's
framers was that the Constitution would be construed in accordance with
what future interpreters could gather of the framers' own purposes,
expectations, and intentions. Inquiry shows that assumption to be
incorrect." I
Now of course you, in your quest for historical meaning, can
disregard this understanding of the Framers, and historians most certainly
should. But if you do so in an effort to make constitutional law, you are
acting in a fashion unauthorized by the authors you are relying upon.
Simply put, you are disregarding the intention of the Framers, and that is
a paradoxical thing to do if you think that their intention is a source of
fundamental law second only to constitutional text.
But here too the Federalisthas a special status. This status does not
derive from its authors' intention that their Papers be employed as an
interpretive guide to the Constitution for lawyers and judges after
ratification. If Powell is right, that would be an inappropriate use. There
was, of course, the intention that the Federalist Papers serve as a
commentary on the Constitution for convention delegates. 86 The status
of the FederalistPapers stems rather from the perception we have of them
as "a general theory of political order. " '
84. CompareAntonin Scalia, Originalism:TheLesserEvil, 57 U.CIN. L. REv. 849
.contemporaneous understanding" of its framers' intentions) with Larry Simon, The
Authority of the Constitution and its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation,58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603 (1985) (noting that in adopting an "originalist"
approach, there remains some confusion as to whether the intent of the drafters, or the
intent of the ratifiers, which are often in conflict, control the interpretation).
(1989) (suggesting that the proper constitutional analysis begins with the text and the

85. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 885, 948 (1985).
86. See Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretation of 'This Constitution', 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1218 (1987).
87. See KAHN, supra note 75.
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The claim of this general theory is itself necessarily general. The
FederalistPapers should not be read as you would read a contract for the
purchase and sale of goods. They are to be read as a reasoned argument
attempting to persuade you of the proper structure of government, of the
institutional relationships among governments, and within the national
government, and of the relationship between the people and the
government they have formed. It is this conception of the Federalistthat
leads me to understand numbers 52 and 57 in the way that I have: State
qualifications imposed on candidates are prohibited only to the extent that
they interfere with the functioning of the House-and by extension the
Senate-as a national legislative body representing the people.
The Federalistis consistent with my general approach to the problem
raised in Term Limits. This approach to the question of a state's authority
to impose qualifications on candidates is an application, in Charles Black's
words, of structure and relationship in constitutional interpretation.8 8 It
has its roots in McCulloch v. Maryland.' Maryland's special tax on the
National Bank would have interfered with the functioning of a federal
institution.
This was unconstitutional.' ° But it did not mean that
Maryland was totally prohibited from acting: a nondiscriminatory
property tax was constitutional. The issue was one of degree and effect.
The scheme of our federalism mandated that the Bank be able to function
in accordance with its charter and that the national purpose not be derailed
by the state.9

The Constitution, of course, is Congress' charter. A state may not
interfere with the functioning of Congress by imposing qualifications on
candidates. But some qualifications that a state might impose would not
have that effect. Does this mean that the dissent is correct, that term
limits should have been held constitutional because they do not interfere
with the functioning of Congress? The answer turns out to be no, but the
reason is virtually ignored by the Court in Term Limits.
VII.
We have to ask ourselves what, in the structure of the Constitution,
makes legislation legitimate and how a limitation on the number of terms
a member of Congress may serve undermines that legitimacy. One way
of thinking about this is to reflect on the constraints imposed by the
88. See CHARLES L. BLACK,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).

JR.,

STRUCTURE

AND

RELATIONSHIP

IN

89. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
90. Id. at 395-96.
91. Id. As oft quoted, Marshall warned "A right to tax, without limit or control, is
essentially a power to destroy." Id. at 391.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

Constitution on members of Congress; constraints apart from those
imposed on Congress itself, such as the enumeration in Article I of
legislative powers, the separation of powers, the Bill of Rights, and the
existence of judicial review.
The constraint I have in mind is
highlighted by considering the ubiquitous unease that constitutional
theorists and partisan politicians both have with the practice of judicial
review.' Judicial review makes many anxious because they see it as
undemocratic, as an exercise of power by judges who have not been
elected and who are not electorally accountable. This anxiety would be
much reduced if, in constitutional adjudication, we were able to draw a
clear line between law application and law creation (this is not possible);
if-and this is related but not the same-the Constitution required no
interpretation (this is not possible); or if the justices were constrained by
rules of extreme deference to the legislature (this is possible but would be
at a painful cost).
In practice the Supreme Court has often engaged in robust judicial
review. Consider the last forty plus years. The Warren Court worked its
famous transformation of constitutional law.'
Many of its decisions
were either attacked or defended by theorists who felt compelled to
address the justification for and practice of judicial review. 4 The central
problem for many was the "counter majoritarian difficulty": 95 laws, duly
enacted by legislators elected by a majority of the people, and accountable
to them, were struck down by judges elected by no one and accountable
to no one, or at least not directly accountable to the people.
92. Classic statements of ubiquitous unease can be found in ALEXANDER BICKEL,
THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).

Compare JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
93. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (striking down the
"Separate But Equal" doctrine in public schools); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)

(holding miscegenation statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding persons in police

custody must be made aware of constitutional privilege against self-incrimination); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding voting district reapportionment presents a

justiciable claim under the Fourteenth Amendment); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964) (holding equal protection clause requires one person one vote); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding the Exclusionary Rule applies to the states under the Due

Process component of the Fourteenth Amendment).
94. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), is the most prominent example
of this and the debate about its constitutional correctness continues. Compare Michael
J. Perry, Brown, Boiling, & Originalism:Why Ackerman and Posner (Among Others)
Are Wrong, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 53 (1995) with Earl M. Maltz, A Dissenting Opinion to
Brown, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 93 (1995).

95. See BICKEL, supra note 92, at 16-23.
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"Judicial legislation" cried politicians opposed to what the Court had
done.916 The justices were not applying the Constitution-whatever that

means-they were voting their own preferences-whatever that means.
And the same theoretical difficulties and political complaints permeate the

debate over Roe v. Wade. 7

I believe there are ways to answer these concerns; I believe the Court

was not legislating. 98 But the existence of these concerns reflect a basic
truth: under our Constitution the power to legislate, to make laws binding
on the people, generally should require that law-makers be elected by the
people and remain electorally accountable to them." It is in these ways

that the Constitution attempts to constrain our representatives in order to
insure that they do represent us.

Is this not the way we think about Congress? Are not election and
electoral accountability vital to our understanding of the Constitution's
empowerment of Congress to legislate under Article I? And isn't this the
problem with term limits?
Term limits would remove electoral
96. See Text of 96 Congressmen'sDeclarationon Integration, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.
12, 1956, at 19 (quoted in BICKEL, supra note 92, at 257). The signers of the Manifesto
criticized the Brown decision and regarded it "as clear abuse of judicial power" which
amounts to "a trend in the Federal judiciary undertaking to legislate." Id.
97. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For Congress' reaction to Roe, see Proposed
ConstitutionalAmendments on Abortion: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. app. 641, 641, 646-47, 650 (1976) (statements of Rep. Abzug, Rep.
Ichord, and Rep. Murphy). Rep. Ichord stated:
The Supreme Court has clearly in this decision-as it has done so many times
in the past-usurped for itself the right to legislate. The Supreme Court has
the specific responsibility of interpreting the Constitution and the legislative
branch has the constitutional responsibility to make the laws. If the men who
sit on the Supreme Court want to make laws, let them run for public office.
Id. at 646. See also John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf- A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (arguing that the Court's decision in Roe was without
Constitutional support and that such a decision should have been made by the Legislative
branch).
98. See HARRYH. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETINGTHE CONSTITUTION: THE SuPREME
COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION (1990).
99. George Washington advanced this position when he reasoned:
The power under the Constitution will always be in the People. It is entrusted
for certain defined purposes, and for a certain limited period, to
representatives of their own chusing; and whenever it is executed contrary to
their Interest, or not agreeable to their wishes, their Servants can, and
undoubtedly will be, recalled.
1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 306-07 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1990) (cited in U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct 1842, 1180 n.26 (1995)).
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accountability for two years in the case of a member of the House and six
for a member of the Senate.
This is serious business because adequate substitute constraints on
members of Congress often do not exist. The Twenty-second Amendment
removes electoral accountability from a second term president and the
presence of electoral accountability had been, and still is in the first term,
an important check on that office. But the President of the United States
is one of the most highly visible people in the world. The media keep him
accountable. Most representatives and senators have low visibility. 1 o
How many of the one hundred senators can you name? How many
representatives? Unless they are in the leadership, or chair an important
committee, or are genuinely charismatic, they are not closely observed by
the national press. And, in the absence of electoral politics, which by
hypothesis are absent, I have my doubts about the adequacy of local
coverage on issues that are not of particular local interest.
What this means is that the substitute for electoral accountability, as
the ultimate check on. members of Congress, would have to be replaced
by a change in the incentives that motivate elected officials. They would
have to become more public regarding. That this would happen is one of
It falls under the rubric
the claims made by advocates of term limits.'
of the "citizen politician," one who goes to Washington for a limited time
and then returns to her community. This, advocates argue, makes an
elected official more alert to community needs and desires. I see no
reason to accept this argument. First, the citizen politician may become
the Beltway insider; Washington may become more attractive than
Hartford. She may never return home. Second, if she intends to return,
her self-interest may be served by the help she gives to a small group
within her constituency. And there is no reason to suppose that that
group's interest is harmonious with the interests of the bulk of her electors
who no longer have an opportunity to punish her. Moreover, on national
issues that receive little local attention except when raised in the context
of an election, there would seem to be no substitute for electoral
accountability as a check on members of Congress.
This is not necessarily to say that, if there were substitute constraints,
term limits should have been held constitutional. Nor is it to suggest that
electoral accountability is working the way it should. Elections are
100. See Richard Morin, Who's in Control? Many Don't Know or Care, WASH.
POST, Jan. 29, 1996, at Al (finding that in a random survey, 54% of the people polled
could not name both of their U.S. Senators and 67% could not name their U.S.
Representative).
101. See generallyGEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION: CONGRESS, TERM LIMITS AND
THE RECOVERY OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1992) (arguing that term limits are a
step toward restoring Congress' competence and respect).
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heavily influenced by money and the advantages of incumbency are
enormous.'0 Reform is necessary. Term limits attack the problem of
incumbency by subverting electoral accountability. This is neither good
constitutional law nor wise public policy. Campaign finance reform is
vastly superior.103 It is not, to be sure, a panacea," ° but in politics
and law nothing is.

102. See Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign FinanceReform: A
Key to Restoring the Health of OurDemocracy, 94 COLuM. L. REv. 1126 (1994). This
article explores the problems of the current congressional campaign finance system and
proposes changes to achieve the reform needed. Id. at 1127. Wertheimer and Manes
explore such changes as reasonable spending limits for congressional races, dramatic
reductions in the flow of political action committees' contributions, closing of the
loopholes that allow certain candidates to receive funding they normally would not be
able to receive from other channels, and overhauling of the Federal Election
Commission. Id.
103. See S. 1219, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 2566, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995). These comprehensive bills pose tough reform and promise real hope for
campaign finance reform. See also Statement of Common Cause PresidentAnn McBride
on Need for Passageof Tough Campaign Fin. Reform (Common Cause, Wash., D.C.)
Jan. 20, 1996.
104. The First Amendment limits the extent to which legislation can restrict the use
of money for political campaigns. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

